Quantity-setting games with lifetime employment contracts as a strategic commitment

Quantity-setting games with lifetime employment contracts as a strategic commitment

This paper considers lifetime employment contracts as a strategic commitment and examines the respective equilibrium outcomes of the two cases of a quantity-setting duopoly game with substitute goods and a quantity-setting duopoly game with complementary goods.

Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Philippine Review of Economics Vol. 49, no. 2 (December 2012), p. 25-40.
Main Author: Ohnishi, Kazuhiro (Author)
Format: Analytics
Language:English
Published: [Quezon City] School of Economics, University of the Philippines 2012.
Subjects:
Labor contract.
Fixed-term labor contracts.
Online Access:https://forms.gle/KZjBv7aRtY6jiL5E9